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The regulation of the production, deployment, and use of arms, 
particularly nuclear arms, has been a topic on which there has been 
considerable dialogue between the United States and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics. It 1s also a matter of grave concern to citizens 
of all nations. But the control of arms, while a worthwhile and Impor­
tant goal, 1s more than an end In Itselft 1t 1s the means toward accom­
plishing other goals, a means of promoting a variety of national Interests.
It 1s Important to understand and to distinguish between arms contol 
as an end and arms control as a means. If arms control 1s an end 1n It­
self, then the purpose of negotiated agreements 1s to determine the fast­
est way to reduce national stockpiles of the weapons which are to be con­
trolled. Tfie effects of this policy, beyond the attainment of a moral 
good, would not be at Issue In the same way as they are when arms control 
1s a means toward accomplishing another goal or set of goals.
When arms control 1s to be effected as a means toward accomplishing 
something more than the general, or specific, control of arms, the purpose 
of negotiated agreements changes. The way 1n which arms control 1s to 
take place, the specific weapons to be reduced or eliminated, the general 
tenor of the proceedings, all of this takes on new meaning when the nego­
tiated agreement 1s meant not only to control arms but to further the 
national Interests of the signatories.
It Is my contention that, for better or for worse, arms control agree­
ments today are meant to do much more than control the production, deploy­
ment, and use of arms. Agreements are a means toward other goals, a way 
to further a variety of national Interests. For that reason, It 1s vital
2to understand precisely whit national Intarasta the othir party (or per- 
t1«s) wishes to advance by entering Into a particular agreement. The 
purpose of this study* then* 1s to explore the relationship between Soviet 
arms control policy and Soviet national Interests 1n the hope that under* 
standing this relationship will allow meaningful arms control agreements 
to be negotiated more easily.
In order to discover what national Interests the Soviet Union wishes 
to advance through arms control, analysis of Soviet declaratory policy Is 
necessary. Declaratory policy 1s meant to provide both a basic and an 
optimum position, one which will provide the Soviets with the greatest 
possible gain. From the standpoint of discovering what national Interests 
the Soviet1' Union wishes to further through effecting a particular policy, 
analysis of declaratory policy 1s useful because 1t amplifies the possi­
bilities for Soviet gain.
The body of this study consists of a point by point analysis of a 
memorandum published 1n Pravda and Izvestla on June 18, 1982 and directed 
at delegates to the United Nations Second Special Session on Disarmament.1 
The memorandum outlines the Soviet Union's comprehensive plan to remove 
the growing threat of nuclear war and to curb the arms race. The plan 1s 
a long-range one which would require numerous negotiated agreements In­
volving the superpowers as well as other nuclear powers. Its goal Is the 
total elimination of nuclear weapons. To verify any agreement which seeks 
to accomplish this would require much more than the national technical 
means currently available, but the memorandum 1s not an agenda for any par­
ticular set of negotiations but rather a general Indication of the direction 
of Soviet thinking on arms control.
One might be tempted to dismiss the memorandum as merely propaganda, 
but that would be a serious mistake. The Soviets, and all governments, 
evaluate policy announcements In terms of the expected reaction of their 
citizens, as well as foreign governments, to various announcements, however,
I. Analytical Nethods of tht Study
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the existence of possible propaganda gains does not necessarily mean that 
a document was written strictly as propaganda. Most political memoranda 
contain an element of propaganda, yet this does not have to affect the 
validity of the national Interests which might be furthered by the Imple­
mentation of a particular policy.
The points which are discussed 1n section II are presented 1n outline 
form In the memorandum. Same of the suggested policies, a test ban and 
limitations on the uses of chemicals for example, are already partially 
1n place. The analysis which makes up this study 1s meant to determine how 
the Soviet Union would benefit from the Implementation of the suggested 
policies. Military and strategic, economic, Ideological, and moral and 
psychological factors, as well as factors relating to foreign relations 
and domestic mood and politics are analyzed. By analyzing possible Soviet 
gains from the recommended arms control policy, It Is possible to discover 
which national Interests the Soviet Union would like to further through 
the regulation of arms.
This Is Important because It should be possible to negotiate more 
easily an arms control agreement 1f one 1s aware of what the Soviets hope 
to gain generally from any such agreement. By bearing In mind that what 
the Soviets seek at the bargaining table 1s really much more than the con­
trol of arms, one 1s able to give proper attention and understanding to 
differences 1n U.S. and Soviet bargaining positions.
If a legitimate Soviet Interest can be furthered by either of two 
proposals, and one of those proposals Is more In keeping with what the 
US would like to accomplish, the Soviets are likely to agree with either 
proposal so long as the American Interest which has been furthered does
5riot jeopardize Soviet gains. By appreciating legitimate Soviet national 
Interests and understanding their relationship to arms control, negotia­
ted agreements are likely to be more easily reached and more successfully 
maintained.
There are several points to keep 1n mind while reading this study.
The first 1s that the study 1s limited to the benefits of the particular 
policy which 1s outlined. The^e may be adverse effects as well but the 
purpose 1s to discover what the Soviets hope to gain by means of arms 
control. The 11st of benefits which 1s discussed under each point and 
within each factor area 1s not meant to be exhaustive. The International 
situation can change rapidly; new gains could result from Implementation 
of the suggested policy while others could be 'ost.
Another Important point to remember Is that the time frames for the 
various benefits differ. Some gains may not be evident for several genera­
tions while others are Immediately visible. Benefits may als<> be of a 
temporary or of a permanent nature. Within the body of the study, no at­
tempt 1s made to give any benefit a particular weight though some may 
seem of obviously greater Importance to the Soviet leadership than others.
The purpose of the study 1s to discover which national Interests the 
Soviets may hope to advance through arms control and not to rank those 
Interests 1n any particular way. For that reason, cleavages among the 
elite which affect priorities attached to national Interests are not dis­
cussed. Deciding which arms control efforts will come first will affect 
which national Interests will receive priority and the methods of arms con­
trol Implementation will be the result of battles within the elite over 
'pet1 national Interests, but, while Interesting, these battles are not 
the focus of the study.
6A final point to boar 1n mind It that tha 1stua Is not that this 
policy will be enacted or that these benefits will necessarily result, 
but that the Soviets could reasonably expect that these benefits and 
others could result. Normally, states sign negotiated agreements which 
are 1n their national Interest. They expect that the benefits they would 
gain will outweigh any limitations which might be placed on the state as 
a result of the agreement. Because of this, the analysis of reasonably 
expected benefits 1s an Important tool with which to discover the relation­
ship between national Interest and arms control.
The study Itself 1s based on several assumptions, the first of which 
1s that all International dealings are based on decision making by rational 
actors. The study does not take Into account anomalous behavior or de­
cision making which 1s based on Irrational motives or duress. An assump­
tion which necessarily follows 1s that the Soviets Intend to and, 1n fact, 
do advance policies which are 1n their national Interest. One must further 
assume that, although the memorandum on which this study 1s based was writ­
ten before Leonid Brezhnev's death, perceptions of what constitutes Soviet 
national 'interest, disregarding priorities, have not changed substantially 
under the leadership of Yuri Andropov.
In evaluating the benefits which could result from the Implementation 
of a particular policy, 1t 1s assumed that the policy Is 1n effect world­
wide, that It 1s observed by all parties and that 1t 1s verifiable. That 
may seem like quite a departure from reality but 1t 1s necessary 1n order 
to analyze expected benefits. A final assumption 1$ that the Soviet Union 
has been primarily responsible for the successful negotiation of any and 
all agreements. This assumption 1s necessary because 1t 1s one which the 
Soviets make themselves.
‘ \ 1
II. Analysis of the Memorandum
1. No First Use
In June 1982. the Soviet leadership announced that 1t would effect 
a significant change 1n Its nuclear strategy by being the first to renounce 
the first use of nuclear weapons of any kind. Since that time, the Soviets 
have repeatedly pointed out that 1f every nation renounced the first use of 
nuclear weapons, the problem of nuclear war would be solved.
Were this policy to be established, what would the military and 
strategic benefits be? First of all, renunciation of first use by the U.S., 
NATO, and China would result 1n an Increased reliance on conventional forces 
where the Soviets maintain a commanding lead 1n both numbers of weapons and 
troops, and, as compared with China, a significant technological lead. The 
Soviets expect NATO troops to resort to the first-use of nuclear weapons 
because of their Inferior conventional strength, as currently deployed, 1n 
Europe. A no first use policy on the part of the United States and NATO 
would require an Increase 1n the number of conventional troops deployed 1n 
Europe. This 1n turn would result 1n an Increased defense burden for those 
countries as well as Increased Internal unrest, due to the unpopularity of 
such a plan.
The public renunciation of first use, however, does not preclude the 
possibility of such action. Soviet nuclear strategy has long relied on the
3
preemptive strike as a means of avoiding a NATO attack. While one may not 
acknowledge this strictly as a benefit, the succesful elements of a preemptive 
strike are enhanced when first use occurs without a public reversal of 
strategic policy.
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8Economic bonoflts which might result from tho renunciation of first 
use of nuclear weapons are not readily apparent. In this case, the method 
of Implementing the policy Is Important. Without the use of preemptive 
strikes to "avoid" attack from the West (or East), the Soviet Union would 
be required to Increase Its level of preparedness for weathering a nuclear 
attack. Superhardening silos or flnetunlng a launch on warning system 
wbuld probably result 1n slightly Increased defense expenditures and this 
of course, would not be a direct economic benefit. This 1s why the method 
of Implementing the policy Is Important. It 1s likely that any Increase 
1n the Soviet level of preparedness for weathering a nuclear strike would 
be the result of technological Innovation. Launch on warning systems, 
particularly, require sophisticated computer technology which could have 
Important Impact on computer use 1n the civilian sector of the Soviet 
economy. Normally, technological spinoff from the military to the civilian 
sector 1s limited but 1n the computer field, which 1s Important to the 
economy as a whole because of Its seemingly limitless possibilities for 
use, exceptions to shared technology may be made.
In all dealings In the International arena the Soviets would seem more 
forthcoming and reasonable as the renunciation of first use of nuclear wea- 
pons has a valuable psychological effect. Despite the fact that parties to 
the agreement could later alter their strategies, no first use Is an Impor­
tant hurdle 1n arms control. If the Soviets were seen as leading the way 
1n this area, 1t would no doubt Increase their credibility as world leaders 
and expand their popular support worldwide.
Domestic benefits from a worldwide no first use policy are similarly 
Intangible. In one sense, the ability to successfully negotiate such an
9agreement would Increase the credibility of the Soviet leadership 1n the 
eyes of Its own population. Whenever a state 1s able to conclude an Im­
portant International agreement, and especially when 1t has taken a lead­
ership role In the negotiations which led to the agreement, Its Inter­
national stature Increases. This leads to a sense of domestic pride, a 
sense that the nation 1s Important and Influential. A government which 
1s fortunate enough to have accomplished an Important feat 1n International 
relations will seem more responsible, more Intelligent, and more legitimate 
to Its citizenry after the conclusion of major negotiated agreement. 
Responsibility for such a success In International relations would be a 
way for Andropov to solidify his standing within the party and with the 
Soviet citizenry. If agreement to a no first use policy was orchestrated 
by the party, with Andropov at Its head (or Brezhnev before him) the Image 
of the party as the defender of peace against the warmongers would have In­
creased legitimacy. In the area of foreign relations, the Image of the 
Soviets as peacemakers would be enhanced.
The renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons 1s also In keeping 
with the Idea of peaceful coexistence which the Soviets have been culti­
vating since the 1950s. The Idea that war between nations with differing 
social systems 1s no longer Inevitable 1s linked to the destructive capa­
bilities of nuclear weapons.
One Ideological benefit which would stem from a worldwide Implementation 
of the policy of no first use Is the reaffirmation of the concept of peace­
ful coexistence. Marx1st-Len1n1st thought Is Increasingly looked upon as 
little more than a justification of Soviet policy. Whether or not this Is 
the case, a manifestation of peaceful coexistence, as a world wide no first
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usewould be, would Increese the credibility of the concept.
The role of the party as a peacemaking force would also be reaffirmed. 
While maintaining that the responsibility for an active defense policy 
rests with the party, the Soviets content that 1t 1s peace which 1s the 
actual goal of the party. The party, however, does not Intend to purchase 
this peace at the price of limited revolutionary activity and of support 
of national Hbaratlon movements. Fortunately for the CPSU, the renunci­
ation of first use of nuclear weapons promotes peace without limiting 
Ideological conflict.
Agreement by the nuclear powers to renounce first use of nuclear wea­
pons would result 1n moral and psychological benefits. Although a no first 
use policy could be reversed, negotiating an agreement which requires the 
signatories to publicly eliminate preemptive strikes as strategic possi­
bilities 1s an Important step 1n arms control. Whether warranted or not, 
a decline 1n the psychic tension and nuclear paralysis which results from 
continued emphasis on the balance of terror and nuclear devastation would 
be a positive moral and psychological outcome.
#
2. work toward an achievable step by step program of nuclear dis­
armament Involving;
— an end to the development of new systems of nuclear weapons, 
— an end to the production of fissionable material for the pur­
pose of creating now types of nuclear weapons,
— an end to the production of nuclear ammunition for all types 
and means of delivery,
— step by step curtailment of accumulated supplies of nuclear 
weapons, Including delivery systems,
— and finally, complete liquidation of all nuclear weapons.
The military and strategic benefits which result from disarmament 
are not always clear. On the surface 1t would seem that there are no 
strategic gains to be made by limiting oneself militarily. Why would 
a nation voluntarily limit Its production and deployment of nuclear 
weapons and expect military and strategic benefits?
It 1s Important to remember that the step by step program of dis­
armament outlined above would not be a unilateral move on the part of the 
Soviet Union. Of course there would be no strategic or military gains for 
the Soviets 1f they were the only nation to disarm. Regarding this disarma­
ment program, 1t 1s Its Implementation by other nuclear powers which pro­
vides the Soviets with strategic benefits.
Were the Chinese, French, and British to be prevented from developing 
new systems of nuclear weapons, they would be, at least until later stages 
of the program, In an Inferior nuclear position v1s-a-v1s the Soviet Union. 
The same would hold true for the developing nuclear powers, India, possibly 
Israel, Pakistan, and others. An end to the production of fissionable ma­
terial for nuclear weapons would further limit the developing nuclear powers.
As the disarmament program progresses, there would be Increasing re­
liance on conventional forces. Eventually according to the program, anaed 
forces would be exclusively conventional. This development would favor the 
Soviets 1n the short run as the Soviets maintain a very large, technically 
up-to-date conventional military system. A movement toward complete reli­
ance on conventional forces would require American policymakers to enlarge 
the standing American army, a move which would necessitate a peacetime 
draft, possibly resulting 1n civil unrest.
In the long run however, American and NATO forces would be able to
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counter any Soviet and WTO threat. The Chinese too Mill be able to de­
velop their conventional forces so as to counter the Soviets but this 
would take some time, assuming that the Chinese do not receive military 
aid or Increased technology transfers from the West.
Economic benefits from this program of nuclear disarmament are many. 
First of all, an end to the development of neM systems of nuclear Meapons 
Mould free at least some of the research and development resources Mhlch 
are noM devoted to the military. Because the military and civilian sec­
tors of the economy are separate and because the military sector has re­
ceived top priority for so long, a diversion of research and development 
personnel, facilities, and money Into the civilian economic sector Mould 
serve as an Important stimulus for overall economic development.
Similarly, at least some of the production resources and more Impor­
tantly, Investment capital, Mhlch had previously been devoted to military 
nuclear development could be diverted to the civilian, light Industrial 
sector of the economy. This Infusion of research and development resour­
ces, productive resources and Investment capital Into the civilian sector 
of the economy Mould help to Increase the overall growth rate of the econo 
my and eventually, result In an Increased standard of living for Soviet 
citizens.
An end to the production of fissionable material for the purpose of 
creating neM types of nuclear Meapons Mould alloM a diversion of nuclear 
technology and resources from the military to the civilian sector. This 
could result 1n an expansion of the use of nuclear energy for Industrial 
and home use. Although the Soviet (Jnfon has Immense oil and gas reserves, 
they remain locked under the tundra 1n Siberia. Increased reliance on
♦ I
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nuclear energy would defer the need for the costly exploration which would 
be necessary to secure future energy needs from the tundra.
A11 1n all, the economy mould benefit from decreased costs of securi­
ty. Without nuclear weapons to produce, maintain, and deploy, there Is no 
need to train scientists ahd troops In nuclear weapons technology. There 
would be some costs Incurred In the destruction of present stockpiles and 
1n the process of diverting resources and capital to the civilian, light 
Industrial sector of the economy, but these would be small In comparison 
with the costs of maintaining and Improving a nuclear arsenal.
Total reliance on conventional weapons would require an Increase 1n 
the conventional military budget but due to overall decreased costs of 
security, the military budget as a whole could be decreased. Monies pre­
viously tied up In nuclear hardware, and the cost of maintaining and se­
curing that hardware, could then be employed 1n more productive areas of 
the economy.
In the area of International relations, the benefits which would stem 
from Implementation of this disarmament program are numerous, first of all, 
there would be an overall decrease 1n International tension. At each step 
of the program was Implemented* nations would breathe a collective sign of 
relief. Relations which had been previously hostile* In particular due to 
the nuclear question (l.e. indie and Pakistan)* would be given a now lease 
on life.
East-West relations would also be Improved. The lave) of cooperation 
needed to pursue such a dltarmanmnt program could be maintained and result 
In many benefits. The West would probably not be aa threatened by the pro­
duction of fissionable material for energy purposes, as they were In the 
pest when fissionable material production N S  ear-markad for nuclear weeeomo.
is
Technical exchanges could be Increased and as East-West tension decreased, 
trade could be expanded.
Other benefits are not quite so tangible. It Is hard to measure the 
value of Increased popular support worldwide. Yet this Increased popular 
support 1s very Important to the Soviets. The po&Ulon of the Soviets 1n 
world power dynamics would gain legitimacy. Were the Soviets to conclude 
such a disarmament treaty 1t would be more difficult for American and other 
Western leaders to depict the Soviet Union as the leader of the forces of 
evil in the modern world. Respect for the Soviet leadership would increase. 
The Soviet Union would become more than a force to be reckoned with; they 
would be a force to be Included, because there would no longer be a reason 
to exclude them from regional disputes, from economic treaties, and from 
world-wide deliberations, simply because of their Communist Ideology.
There would be an Increase 1n popular support on the domestic front 
as well, particularly in the scientific community. No longer would the 
most promising scientists and technicians be automatically siphoned off and 
shunted Into the field of nuclearweaponsdevelopment. Of course, the best 
scientists will always find themselves 1n military research and development 
but there will be a need for fewer technological "draftees."
Eventually, as the standard of living Increases, the popularity of the 
Soviet leadership with the general population will rise. The Impression 
that the leadership 1s finally able to deliver what It has promised for so 
long 1n terms of material gains, along with the more respected standing of 
the Soviet Union In the world community, will result 1n Increased political 
legitimacy.
By political legitimacy It 1s meant that the general population as a
14
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whole views the particular Individuals who hold power as the legitimate, 
credible, and chosen leaders 1n that particular society. The general 
population as a whole has confidence and a stake 1n Its politically legiti­
mate leadership.
As political legitimacy Increases 1n Soviet society, so will politi­
cal normalization. Political normalization 1s something of a domestic de­
tente, a relaxation of tensions between government and the governed. In a 
politically normal society, there 1s a link between the political activity 
of the governed and the actions of the government, and more Importantly, the 
governed are aware of this link and feel the Impact of their Influence. 
Increased political legitimacy, which stems from Increased material gain 
for the average Soviet citizen, could eventually result 1n the formation 
of such a link and political normalization 1n Soviet society.
Success 1n Implementing the disarmament program outlined above would 
allow the Soviets to shift their attention from the foreign to the domestic 
scene. Within the next few decades, the Soviets will be governing a state 
1n which the peoples who live East of the Ural Mountains will play a greater 
role In Soviet society. Demographic and cultural changes will require poli­
tical and Ideological changes. There could be a period of some unrest 
while Europeans and Aslans adjust to the new realities of political life 1n 
the Soviet Union and 1t would be to the Soviet's advantage If this coincided 
with a period of International calm resulting from successful arms control 
efforts.
A period of International calm might also Increase Soviet resolve to 
confront and solve domestic problems, particularly 1f the International co­
operation which was evident 1n the conclusion of arms control treaties was
16
tp continue after the conclusion of the negotiations. Increased techno­
logical. cultural and educational exchanges would bring the Soviets numerous 
new Ideas which might then be employed to cure domestic social, Industrial, 
scientific and economic 111s.
On the Ideological front, the program for total nuclear disarmament 
suggested above would be the highest possible example of peaceful coexis­
tence. The party could present this for domestic consumption as tangible 
proof of the triumph of Marxism-Leninism over warmongering Western capital­
ism.
Along with this might come something of a Western form of the Leninist/ 
Khrushchevlan concept of peaceful coexistence. Without the traditional 
view of the Soviets as public enemy number one, and building on the coopera­
tion manifested 1n successful arms control, 1t 1s possible that the West 
could come to view Communism as an alternate social system, one which need 
not be eradicated from the face of the earth. Whether the Soviets embrace 
the Ideals of Marxism-Leninism wholeheartedly or whether Ideology Is nothing 
more than a justification for social Imperialism, uncoupling Communist Ide­
ology from the Soviet menace would lend an air of much desired respectability 
to Soviet Ideological conquests among the non-aligned.
There 1s, of course, no doubt that there are several moral and 
psychological benefits to reap from total nuclear disarmament. The Soviets 
are no less a moral society than any other and realize fully the moral Im­
plications of a nuclear holocaust. Having suffered massive losses of life 
and property 1n World War II, the Soviets have no desire to experience such 
devastation again, nor, I submit, to visit such destruction on any other 
people unless the very existence of the Soviet people 1s at stake.
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Pursuing the suggested nucleer disarmament program would also result 
1n decreased nuclear terror and Increased psychic security. The balance 
of terror can take a terrible psychological toll on a society without that 
society even being aware of the cause of Its panic, creative pallor, or 
hopeless mood. Shifts 1n the psychic mood of a nation. Its level of 
security, Its perception of risk, can take many generations to detect.
One can only surmise that the cynicism of this age might fade given a more 
hopeful view of the fate of humankind.
3. Limitation and Curtailment of Strategic Weapons.
The fact that the control of strategic arms 1$ given particular em­
phasis 1n the memorandum demonstrates the role of these weapons 1n Soviet 
military planning, In order to understand the military and strategic bene­
fits of curtailing strategic weapons, 1t Is Important to know something of 
Soviet nuclear strategy as expressed In open Soviet sources.
Standard Soviet scenarios assume that war will be triggered 1n Europe 
by the Western forces. NATO will attempt a direct conventional attack on 
one or several of the socialist states 1n Eastern Europe and will threaten 
the security of the Soviet Union.® WTO troops, under the direction of the 
Soviets, will join with Soviet troops who are stationed 1n Eastern Europe
and together, they will pursue a massive counteroffensive which will success-
*
fully push NATO troops much further West than the Initial FEBA. With their 
backs to the wall, that 1s, the Atlantic Ocean, NATO troops, under the di­
rection of the Americans, will deploy tactical nuclear weapons.
The Soviet strategic response 1s overwhelmingly nuclear. Once nuclear weapons 
are Introduced by NATO forces, the launching of nuclear strikes will be the 
primary method of attack followed by the swift advance of tank and motorized
rifle units whose task 1t 1s to exploit the breeches In NATO lines ere* 
ated by the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
The Soviets expect that an armed conflict between the superpowers 
would escalate from conventional to tactical nuclear weapons, to Inter- 
mediate range weapons, and finally, to strategic Intercontinental arms.
As one superpower or the other finds Itself Incapable of maintaining a 
defensive line, It will resort to a wider use of nuclear weapons. In 
Soviet scenarios, 1t 1s always the NATO troops who find themselves unable 
to defend their territory and who must resort to escalation of the conflict 
buv 1t 1s possible to Imagine the Soviets 1n a similar situation. If 
use of strategic weapons was curtailed, how would the Soviets benefit?
First of all, limitations on strategic weapons would limit the possi­
bility for a surprise nuclear strike on Soviet territory which would cause 
mass destruction. One of the Soviets' greatest strategic fears 1s that 
the West will launch a nuclear first strike without political or military 
warning. Such a first strike on Soviet territory would almost certainly 
be accomplished by use of ICBHs, Long Range Aviation (LRA), or other stra­
tegic means rather than by tactical or Intermediate range nuclear weapons.
If strategic weapons were eliminated from NATO/WTO conflict scenarios, 
the Soviet civilian losses and damage to Soviet territory would be limited. 
Currently, the US maintains no forward land-based systems (FBS) 1n Western 
Europe which can strike Soviet territory. Without strategic weapons, In­
cluding SLBMs, Soviet territory 1s secure from nuclear strikes other than 
those launched from NATO forces who have advanced Into Eastern Europe Or 
nuclear air strikes by forces stationed 1n Western Europe. The Soviets 
appear confident that defenses against these possibilities are adequate.
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The Soviets would also benefit by eliminating what they see as an 
American advantage In the area of strategic weapons. The American nuclear 
defensive system, based on ICBMs, IRA, and submarine-launched weapons. Is 
formidable. Were this defensive system to be .Imlted In any way. by 
strategic arms control, the Soviets would benefit by the corresponding 
Increase 1n the Importance of conventional, tactical, and Intermediate 
range weapons as the Soviets currently have a numerical advantage over 
NATO forces 1n Europe.
A successful strike on Soviet territory by any other power would al­
most certainly be a strategic effort. Although China could conceivable use 
Intermediate range or even tactical nuclear weapons to strike Soviet terri­
tory. long range weaponry would be needed to attempt mess destruction. By 
negotiating the limitation and curtailment of strategic nuclear weapons, 
the USSR would effectively eliminate the possibility of a crippling nuclear 
strike by the Chinese.
There would also be economic benefits for the Soviet Union. It would 
be possible to direct the production resources and Investment capital which 
are presently used 1n strategic weapons production to the civilian light 
Industrial sector of the economy. Research and development resources might 
also be directed. Overall defense costs could drop and economic diversion 
could give the economy a boost. LRA capital and resource? could be diverted 
to the civllan aviation system. Reduction and elimination of silos would 
eventually result In a modest Increase 1n the amount of arable land avail­
able for agricultural use.
A reduction 1n East-West tension would surely be an Important Inter­
nationa! development. With the cooperation necessary to complete an agree­
ment on strategic arms control would come Increased cooperation 1n other
fields and all of the benefits which cone from a real detente. By Uniting 
the use of strategic nuclear arms, the possibility of a strategic nuclear 
strike on US territory 1s United, The chances of an undetected first 
launch by the Soviets would be decreased and this would* of course* facili­
tate an Improvement 1n US-Soviet relations.
Esteem for the Soviet leadership would also rise on the domestic front. 
If lower defense costs and economic diversion result In a higher standard 
of living for the average Soviet citizen, the security and the popularity 
of the Andropov regime will be ensured. Similarly, a genuine feeling of 
greater security from Western attack, particularly nuclear attack* among 
the general population could result In Increased respect for* and active 
cooperation with, the Soviet leadership.
Negotiation of a successful treaty limiting and curtailing strategic 
arms 1s another example of peaceful coexistence 1n action. When backed by 
International cooperation and agreement, this Ideological concept has great­
er credibility.
Because the chances are good that, following the limitation and curtail­
ment of strategic weapons, Soviet territory would not be subject to nuclear 
attack, the psychological mood of the Soviet population could Improve. Nu­
clear terror and psychic oppression which accompany nuclear threats would 
decrease In time as generations lived In greater security from nuclear, and 
especially surprise nuclear, attack.
4. Limitation and Curtailment of Nuclear Weapons 1n Eurupe.
— eventual total elimination of all nuclear weapons
£
— current proposal for European arms control.
— Soviets would decrease Intermediate range nuclear weapons 
(SS-20s) to British and French levels. All others would
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be deployed behind the Ural (fountains.
— The United States Mould not be permitted to deploy any FBS 
that can strike Soviet territory from Western Europe.
Because Europe Is generally considered a flashpoint In US-Soviet relations, 
It 1s given special emphasis 1n the memorandum. The eventual total elmlna- 
t1on of all nuclear weapons 1s called for, but as a move toward that goal, 
let us analyze the current Soviet position on arms control In Europe.
The military and strategic benefits of this position are as follows. 
F!rst of all, Soviet redeployment of SS-20s behind the Urals would beef up 
the nuclear forces along the Chinese border bringing military pressure on 
the Chinese to toe the Soviet line. Though this redeployment 1s only tem­
porary, assuming that the goal of total nuclear disarmament Is attainable, 
1t 1s useful In conveying to the Chinese, and the rest of the world, the 
seriousness with which the Soviets view their Interests In Asia.
If the United States was not permitted to deploy any weapons which 
could strike Soviet territory from Western Europe, the Soviets would be 
limiting significantly the possibility of a nuclear attack on Soviet terri­
tory. French and British nuclear weapons can strike Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union but the limited number of these weapons makes 1t Impossible 
for French or British strategists to seriously consider the possibility of 
a successful nuclear strike on the Soviet Union, that Is, one which would 
not result 1n the complete annihilation of French and British civilization. 
If, In fact, the possibilities for nuclear attack on Soviet territory are 
limited by European arms control, the general scope of the war may also be 
limited. If a nuclear conflict could be limited to European territory, and 
of course, this 1$ a big N1f," and assuming that strategic arms control had
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not already baon negotiated, Uniting nuclear conflict to Europe would do 
something to decrease the chances of escalation to the strategic level.
Although this particular Soviet proposal does not eliminate nuclear 
weapons, any decroase 1n nuclear aria Increases reliance on conventional 
forces. Soviet troops enjoy a comfortable lead In the number of convention­
al troops and arms deployed currently 1n the European theatre and so would 
benefit from the Increased tactical Importance attached to conventional 
forces.
When assessing the specifics of the current Soviet proposal for arms 
control in Europe* the economic benefits loot sparse. If nuclear weapons 
are removed from Europe and destroyed* rather than redeployed 1n Asia, 
there could be some savings,. Any decrease In til costs of security which 
1s shifted through economic diversion Into the civilian, light Industrial 
lacier of the economy could result in an Increase In the overall growth 
rate and this, of course, would benefit the soviet Union, It ts possible 
•iso that Increases m  East-Mast trade and technological eathanges might 
result from a cooperative International atmosphere.
Any real success 1n arms control 1$ likely to decrease International 
tension. Popular support for the Soviet leadership would Increase among the 
general populations of Western Europe and Worth America, especially 1f this 
success 1s reached by a reduction 1n the number of Soviet arms In Eastern 
Europe and the European portion of the USSR. The more forthcoming the 
Soviets appear 1n the area of anas control, the more likely 1t Is that they 
will be specifically Included, rather than barely tolerated, 1n the world 
power scheme.
Western Industrialized nations would be less successful 1n convincing
*
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developing options to ally themselves with the West against the forces of 
evil, that 1s, the Soviet Union, 1f the Soviets Mere, 1n fact, reasonably 
cooperative, In the area of arms control. The Image of the USSR as a de­
fender of peace 1n the modem world, which the Soviets attempt to cultivate, 
particularly 1n the Third World, could only be enhanced by the limitation 
and curtailment of nuclear weapons 1n Europe.
On the domestic front, confidence 1n Andropov's ability to lead the 
Soviet people successfully would Increase were he to conclude a major Eu­
ropean arms control treaty with the United States. And If economic gains 
were made, as a result of lower costs of security or Increased trade and 
technological exchanges, the Impression that the Soviet leadership Is final­
ly ready, willing, and able to deliver on Its promises of a better life 
could create political legitimacy.
The viability of peaceful coexistence as an ideological concept would 
be proven by the limitation of nuclear weapons 1n Europe. The Soviets could 
bill themselves as the winners 1n the ideological struggle for peace and 
security, both at home and abroad. When a Marx1»t-len1n1st Ideal appears 
to actually be manifested 1n International, or domestic, relations, 1t 
strengthens the Ideological system as a whole. And whether or not that 
system Is merely justification for Soviet power politics, strengthening 
Soviet Ideology lends credibility to the Soviet Union as a whole.
To the degree that arms control In Europe 1s perceived as being success­
ful and lasting, there would be a decrease 1n the levels of societal psycho­
logical tension. Living on e powder keg tends to affect one's outlook 1n 
life. Real arms control could give Europe, both Eastern and Western, as 
well as the United States and the Soviet Union, a psychological shot 1n the
O
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arm and revive a hopeful, vital outlook which 1s particularly Important 
1n the Soviet Union where citizens are so often asked to put up with sacri­
fices today for a better tomorrow.
5. Complete and Universal Ban on Testing of Nuclear Weapons.
Imposition of this ban on other countries 1s whet will bring military 
and strategic benefits to the Soviet Union. Without the possibility of 
testing nuclear weapons, states may concentrate their military resources on 
present levels of technology and on conventional forces.
The Soviet Union and the United States are capable of developing nuclear 
weapons without the need for test explosions. China and the developing 
nuclear powers could still benefit from actual munitions testing and so the 
ban has the possibility of freezing the nuclear technology of these states at 
a level lower than that of the Soviet Union, at least for a short period of 
time. And as 1s mentioned above, the significant conventional strength of 
the Soviet Union ensures military gains when there Is Increased reliance on 
conventional forces.
The economic benefits of Implementation of a real test ban rest mainly 
on the Idea of economic diversion. In this case, research and development, 
as well as military techologlcal, resources which might have been employed 
1n nuclear weapons testing are now free to be used 1n the civilian, light 
Industrial sector of the economy. Concentration of these resources 1n the 
civilian sector 1s more likely to result 1n an Increase 1n the overall 
economic growth rate and 1n a corresponding rise 1n the standard of living.
By eliminating nuclear weapons testing, the Soviets eliminate the costs 
of environmental damage and attempts to clean up and secure test sites. The 
economic costs of damage to human health and Increased health care needs are
25
also avoided.
By limiting nuclear explosions for show by the nuclear powers, there 
should be a lessening of international tension. The Soviet Union long ago 
demonstrated adequately Its nuclear capabilities and therefore does not re­
quire the propaganda effects of nuclear testing. By denying tangible proof 
of nuclear capabilities to other nations, the Soviets help preserve tho 
nuclear monopoly of the superpowers.
There might also be greater esteem for the Soviet leadership 1n the 
Third World and other areas which might have been subject to environmental 
damage and serious health problems due to nuclear weapons testing. If the 
Soviet Union Is perceived as the leader of any test ban effort, Its Image 
of Itself as peacemaker gains credibility.
A complete and universal test ban would also quell any Internal dissent 
by environmentalists concerned about a possible renewal of testing on Soviet 
or foreign territory. The security of the environmental quality of life 
wltMn the Soviet Union would also beassured If the Soviets continued their 
adherence to a ban on nuclear weapons testing.
Peaceful coexistence takes on a more universal meaning when viewed 1n 
terms of a test ban. Normally referring to calm relations between East and 
West, and the differing social systems, Communism and capitalism, peaceful 
coexistence 1s a necessity between all nations and would be enhanced by a 
successful ban on nuclear weapons testing. The Idea of peaceful coexistence 
1s never one which limits Soviet actions and so 1s 1n keeping with the sug­
gestion that others adhere to behavior which benefits, without significantly 
constraining, the Soviet Union.
Protection of the environment and human health by banning the testing
of nuclear weapons 1s In Itself a moral good and the Soviets surely recog­
nize this benefit. Psychological benefits Include reduced anxiety and 
fear of accidents which could result from testing nuclear weapons.
6. Prevention of Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
By Uniting the number of nuclear powers 1n the world, the Soviets 
can limit the threats to Its security. Preventing the further prolifera­
tion of nuclear weapons would help to preserve the present nuclear monopoly. 
Currently, only the Soviet Union, the United States, 6reat Britain, and 
France have nuclear weapons power which 1s backed by huge quantities of 
effective nuclear delivery systems. If the Soviets can limit the expansion 
of nuclear threats to Its security, particularly from China, Its overall 
defense strategy 1s strengthened.
By preventing small powers from acquiring nuclear capabilities, the 
Soviet Union can shut the door to possible nuclear blackmail. A ban on 
cooperative acquisition (sharing nuclear weapons and technology with allies) 
would give the Soviets a valuable excuse for not sharing Its nuclear capa­
bilities with Its WTO allies. Eventually, though probably many years from 
now, WTO allies might be In a position to demand nuclear technology ov aban­
don the alliance. And If the WTO nations were to gain nuclear weapons tech­
nology, the Soviet hold over Its East European allies would start to loosen. 
If the Soviets are bound by International treaty not to permit cooperative 
acquisition, this makes a convenient excuse for not abandoning Its role as 
nuclear guarantor of socialist security.
The economic benefits from preventing further proliferation of nuclear 
weapons appear minimal. If this policy sllmlnates the costs of sharing nu­
clear technology, weapons, and delivery systems with Soviet allies, which
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night have barn nacessary in tha distant futura, thera could ba soma savings. 
And assuming that a non-prollftratlon agreement wars aaslly verifiable, 
there could be a decline 1n the costs of monitoring possible nuclear pro­
liferation. Monies which might have bean spant on cooparatlva acquisition 
and monitoring worldwide nuclear proliferation might then be directed to 
the civilian, light Industrial sector of the economy but probably 1n amounts 
too small to alone cause significant economic growth.
Conclusion of a verifiable and successful non-proliferation agreement 
would be met with profound relief on the part of the United States and NATO.
As the East-West nuclear monopoly becomes Institutionalized, the Soviet Union 
and the United States would be participating 1n a joint effort to police tha 
nuclear actions of the rest of tha world. Relations between tha two might 
ba expected to be more cordial and cooperative following every successful 
arms control venture.
Within the Soviet Union, the legitimacy and credibility of the party 
would Increase as does Its success 1n taking a real leadership role 1n world 
affairs and the quest for peace. As those outside the USSR coma to view It 
with a new respect for 1t$ ability to bring about Important arms con to1 suc­
cesses, so the general population may come to see Its leadership as fulfilling, 
at last, Its many Ideals.
Marxism-Leninism and the concept of peaceful coexistence are reaffirmed 
with every arms control success. If the USSR 1s able to negotiate Its securi­
ty and the security of Its allies and others from a position equal to that of 
the United States, the Ideology upon which the Soviet Union rests (or the 
excuses with which the USSR justifies Its unpopular activities) gains credi­
bility. Communist thought will be harder to peg as the bane of American
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existence If the Soviets depict their actions successfully es peaceful co­
existence 1n action.
Preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons also provides 
a moral and psychological hurdle. A non-proliferation agreement which 1s 
perceived as a success 1s the beginning of the end. It Is a sign that 
real progress can result from real efforts to control the production, de­
ployment, and use of nuclear arms. Once the problem of nuclear weapons 
development ceases to spread. It becomes more manageable and efforts to go 
even further 1n arms control seem more attainable.
7. Nuclear Free Zones: Northern Europe, Balkans, Middle East, Africa 
and Others.
The Idea of nuclear-free zones 1s not a new one. What military 
and strategic benefits would the creation of such zones bring to the Soviets 
1n the suggested geographical areas?
First of all, Northern Europe and the Balkan region are both areas where 
WTO and NATO troops would engage one another In case of a military conflict 
between the two alliances. Northern Europe, 1n particular, has historically 
been a popular Invasion route Into Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 
Creating nuclear-free zones 1n these areas would limit the nuclear nature 
of any military conflict. In order to strike Soviet territory with nuclear 
weapons, NATO troops would have to advance rapidly Into WTO territory In 
order to come within tactical or theatre nuclear range of the Soviet Union. 
NATO could choose to escalate the conflict by employing Intermediate range 
missiles or launching strategic ICBMs and thereby opening American territory 
to certain retaliation 1f NATO troops were not able to advance to within 
tactical range.
In this way, the existence of a nuclear free zone could forct NATO 
to expose all of Western Europe and the United States to nuclear retali­
ation. should NATO use any nuclear weapons against Soviet territory.
The Middle East 1s an area with significant American Influence. Any
nuclear weapons which would be deployed 1n that region are likely to be
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under US or Israeli control. Creating a nuclear-free zone there would 
prevent the United States from securing Its energy needs from the Arab 
states by nuclear blackmail or from enlarging Its Middle Eastern sphere 
of Influence and putting It on a nuclear footing.
Africa Is a region with significant Soviet Influence and Involvement. 
Presently, any nuclear deployment would likely be Soviet but there 1s no 
strategic need for such a move at this time. It 1s possible that 1n the 
future, the United States might attempt to deploy nuclear forces In Africa 
to counter conventional Soviet and/or Cuban troops. The creation of a 
nuclear-free zone 1n Africa could prevent this.
In the economic realm, limited deployment of nuclear weapons would 
cut defense spending but only by a relatively small amount. If however, 
limited deployment was followed by a cut In the production of nuclear wea­
pons, economic diversion could bring capital and production resources Into 
the civilian, light Industrial sector. A sufficient shift 1n resources 
could produce an Increase In the economic growth rate td»1ch, eventually, 
could be reflected tn a rise 1n the standard of living.
Popular support for the Soviet leadership would Increase worldwide 1f 
the Soviets were perceived as the moving force behind the creation of nuclear 
free zones. Particularly 1n the United States and In Western Europe, support 
for any kind of reduction 1n nuclear weapons deployment runs high with the 
general public. Assurances to Africa and the Middle East that the Soviet
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Union dots not wont to spread the scourge of nucloor weapons Into those 
regions can only onhanco tho Imago of tho Soviets as poacoful progrosslvos. 
By convincing states 1n Africa and tho Middle East that by allowing Soviet 
troops Into their territory, they are not making their countries Into 
nuclear targets, access to overseas bases may broaden for the Soviets.
At heme, successful economic diversion which results 1n a rise 1n the 
standard of living could Increase party popularity. As popular support for 
the Soviet leadership rises abroad, self-esteem rises on the domestic front. 
Marx1st-Len1n1st successes are Soviet successes, Soviet successes are Rus­
sian successes, and Russian successes are reasons to be proud of one's coun­
try and genuinely Interested 1n and supportive of Its leadership. Political 
legitimacy and the process of political normalization could follow.
Nuclear-free zones, particularly If one were to be created 1n Northern 
Europe, are Immediate and tangible examples of peaceful coexistence. No 
Ideological backsliding or approval of bourgeois, capitalist states Is 
necessary. The Idea of nuclear-free zones promotes the Internationalist 
aspects of Marxism-Leninism. The Soviet Union successfully wrests Islands 
of safety from the clutches of the warmongering Nest, and all while peace­
fully coexisting.
Nuclear-free zones do give the Impression of being safe houses In the 
storm of nuclear warfare. At least on a regional basis, they allow for a 
release of some of the psychological nuclear tension which characterizes de­
veloped, media-conscious societies today. There 1s also the hope that these 
zones can be enlarged. While nuclear free zones would only prevent the 
legal deployment of nuclear weapons In the designated regions, and not pre­
vent the use of such weapons, creation of the zones 1s a positive move
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from a psychological standpoint.
8. Ban and Liquidation of Chemical Weapons.
From this point on. the focus of the memorandum shift from 
nuclear arms control to more general military restrictions. The area of 
chemical weapons appears to be one 1n which the Soviets lead In the amount 
of weapons stockpiled and 1n technological defense capabilities so 1t 1s 
not Immediately obvious what military and strategic benefits the Soviet 
Union would be likely to reap from the liquidation of chemical weapons.
Of course, weapons which are banned and even liquidated can be reintroduced 
on the sly and under these circumstances their strategic value Increases 
due to the element but the assumption 1n this analysis 1s that all agreements 
are verifiable. Since that 1s so. the genuine ban on liquidation of chemical 
weapons would seem to have no military or strategic benefits for the Soviets.
Implementation of this ban would, however, have some economic benefits. 
Defense costs could drop because the costs of producing and maintaining 
chemical weapons stockpiles would be eliminated. Developing, producing, 
and training troops In the use of chemical weapons defense systems 1s also 
costly. The same 1s true of civil defense systems which are necessary to 
protect civilians from chemical weapons.
Research and development resources, capital and production resources, 
for both chemical weapons and military and civil defense systems, could then 
be diverted to the civilian, light Industrial sector of the economy. Even 
without nuclear arms control, 1t 1s possible to employ economic diversion to 
Improve the economic picture of the Soviet Union.
A ban on the use of chemical weapons and the liquidation of present 
stockpiles Is an Idea which enjoys great popularity. Were the Soviet Union 
to Implement this ban and actively support Its verification. Its own popularl 
ty would Increase. Of course, the Soviet Union, like other countries, has
nlong glvtn lip service to tho Idea of a chemical weapons ten. A looter- 
ship role in bringing this 1tea to fruition would enhance the USSR's role 
as a great power and Its Image as peacemaker.
Again, support and respect on an International scale are matched by 
Increased legitimacy and credibility within the Soviet Union. And If the 
standard of ittvtng were to rise as a result of economic diversion from 
the military to the civilian sector of the economy, the popular support 
for the current leadership could only Increase.
The concept of peaceful coexistence In International relations lays 
the groundwork for chemical, as well as nuclear arms control. The Idea 
that war between states with differing social systems 1s no longer neces­
sary does not entail the concept that weapons systems of differing social 
systems should necessarily be humane, but If the Soviets succeed In Tre­
ating a sort of Marxlst-Lenlnlst defense policy with a human face, so much 
the better for them. The Image of Communism as a peace seeking Ideology 1s 
enhanced and 1t becomes harder and harder for Western politicians to bill 
the Soviets as the Devil Incarnate.
Numerous moral objections to the use of chemical weapons have been 
mate since their Introduction to the battlefield during World War I. If 
the Soviets are successful 1n marshalling support for a chemical weapons 
ban, they will have accomplished a moral good for themselves and for all 
humankind.
A genuine, verifiable ban on the use of chemical weapons and liquida­
tion of present chemical stockpiles could eliminate the panic which 1s 
created on the battlefield following employment of such weapons. It could 
also eliminate, or effectively reduce, the fear that such weapons might be
used on defenseless civilian populations. The psychological effects of 
chemical weapons can outweigh the physiological effects, particularly when 
a group of soldiers or civilians has no chemical defense system. A ban on 
the use of chemical weapons might reduce this fear and panic.
9. Restriction of Naval Activity.
-rocket-carrying submarines should remain within their agreed-
t
upon areas of military patrol.
— limitations on the deployment of new ballistic missile systems 
on submarines.
— refusal to deploy sea-based missiles with a range greater 
than land-based missiles.
— expansion of confidence-bullding measures on the seas and oceans, 
especially In those regions where many naval paths meet.
— transformation of the Mediterranean See Into a zone of stable 
peace and cooperation.
— strengthening of peace and security 1n the Persian Gulf.
Here all of the above naval restrictions to be Imposed, the Soviet 
Union would reap a great many military and strategic benefits. Expansion of 
confidence building measures Is one such benefit. Although this 1s specifi­
cally spelled out 1n the fourth point, 1t 1., a by-product of other suggested 
naval restrictions.
If rocket-carryljg submarines were required to remain within agreed-upon 
areas of patrol, departure by a nuclear-armed submrlne from a designated 
area could be taken as a warning of imminent attack. Warning times for 
hostile naval activity would generally Increase. Designating areas of 
military patrol for rocket-carrying submarines and expanding confidence-
building measures 1n areas with high 'vels of naval traffic* would give 
the Soviets a greater awareness of Western naval activity. Restrictions 
on this activity would act to 'contain' American nuclear capabilities to 
some extent and to lessen the chances of spontaneous naval conflict over 
disputed waters.
Any limitation on the deployment of new ballistic missile systems on 
submarines would affect US opportunities to modernize Its submarine-based 
nuclear systems. Refusal to deploy sea-based missiles with a range 
greater than land-based missiles 1s an attempt to bring submarine-based 
nuclear weapons systems to the bargaining table, particularly 1n the case 
of arms control 1n Europe. If sea-based systems In the Atlantic were 
limited to the range of currently deployed American land-based systems, 
the US would be prevented from striking Soviet territory from the Atlantic.
kind of blind attack on the USSR Is what Soviet strategic planners 
seem to fear most. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, through the for­
tune, or misfortune, of geography, 1s able to move Its sea-based systems 
within land-based range of the US and other potential enemies without much 
difficulty. This Is because both the United States and several European 
states have relatively open coastlines with major cities, such as New York, 
London, Washington, O.C., Paris, and Los Angeles, which could be struck by 
nuclear attack by Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missiles from Inter­
national waters.
The suggestion that the Mediterranean Sea be transformed Into a zone 
of stable peace and cooperation, and that peace and security 1n the Persian 
Gulf be strengthened Is an Indication that the Soviets would like a greater 
piece of the action 1n those areas.
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In the case of the Mediterranean, this could be the Initial rumblings 
of a Soviet move to force non-reg1onal navies out of the area through de­
militarization, Including the removal of US SLBM systems which threaten 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Increased Soviet naval activity 1n 
the Persian 6ulf would strengthen Its strategic position In the event of a 
move to seize Middle Eastern oil fields. In any case, the suggestion of 
formal zones of stability, peace, security, and cooperation reflect the 
USSR's strategic Interests 1n these regions.
The economic benefits of naval arms control rest largely on the possi­
bility of economic diversion. An end to new ballistic missiles systems on 
submarines would mean an end to research and development In that area. These 
resources^ along with capital and production resources, could then be em­
ployed 1n the civilian, light Industrial sector of the Soviet economy. If 
sea-based missiles with a range greater than land-based missiles were ef­
fectively banned, the Soviets would find It easier to resist the temptation 
to try to beat the Americans at their own game, that 1s, the development of 
long range submarine-based missiles. This would result 1n savings which would 
be made available for economic diversion.
Increasing the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea and the 
Persian Gulf would also serve as a safeguard against a disruption of trade 
and oil movements which could cause serious, 1f temporary, economic problems 
for the Soviet Union and Its East European allies.
Successful naval arms control would result 1n lower levels of Interna­
tional tension. Confidence building measures expanded as a sign of Soviet 
goodwill, would create more International openness concerning naval activity. 
More seas would be open to more navies, while at the same time, rocket-carrying
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submarines would be restricted, all 1n the hopes of decreasing the likeli­
hood of naval confrontation.
Once the Issue of sea-based nuclear systems, their range, and deploy­
ment, and so forth, 1s settled, arms control agreements covering land-based 
systems would be easier for the Soviets to negotiate. This too would con­
tribute to a reduction of International tension.
Although gunboat diplomacy 1s a term to which the Soviet! would most 
likely object, greater Soviet naval activity 1n the Persian Gulf, and In 
certain areas of the Mediterranean Sea, would act as a tangible sign of 
the Soviet Union's desire to regain Its former Influence In Middle Eastern 
politics, or at least, to counter American Influence In the region. The 
Soviets might even seek to affect the Iran-Iraq war with Its Increased 
naval presence 1n the Persian Gulf area. Although this aspect of the sug­
gested naval restrictions would not be likely to reduce International ten­
sion, especially In the volatile Middle East, It would Increase Soviet 
visibility and, possibly. Its International political Influence.
At home, where naval power 1n particular equals prestige, pride In 
the Soviet Union for Its ability to contain the US Navy would be the result 
of successful Implementation of the suggested naval restrictions. If defense 
capabilities seem greater following a naval arms control agreement, and 1n 
fact, the bear has managed to restrain the eagle, this will help the process 
of political legitimacy and normalization. And should economic diversion 
successfully Increase the growth rate of the economy, greater confidence 
In the party, and 1n Its ability to provide a long-awaited rise In the 
standard of living of the average Soviet citizen, would be an Important re­
sult of naval arms control.
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Like any form of arms control, restrictions on naval activity affirm 
the spirit of peaceful coexistence. When all waters are open to navies of 
all nations, regardless of the social system which creates them, the concept 
of peaceful coexistence becomes tangible and because of this, gains credi­
bility.
If these naval restrictions were Imposed, they would form a psychologi­
cal turning point 1n naval arms control. The restrictions on armaments, 
combined with an expansion of confidence building measures, would give the 
Impression of real progress toward peace. Levels of trust between nations 
Is difficult. If not impossible, to quantify but, especially when breaking 
new ground, or 1n this case water, 1n arms control, psychological barriers 
to cooperation can be broken and great confidence 1n constructive relations 
can be the result.
10. Limitation and Curtailment of Conventional Weapons and Troops.
Conventional arms control 1s an area which seems to lack military 
and strategic benefits for the Soviet Union. Because the USSR has greater 
numerical strength 1n troops and weapons than the United States, as well 
as conventional forces which are technologically superior to those of the 
Chinese, It would appear that any attempt to equalize the numbers of troops 
and the technological levels of weaponry would be detrimental to the Soviet 
strategic position.
There would be, however, some economic benefits from conventional arms 
control. While conventional weapons are less expensive to develop and con­
ventional forces are less expensive to maintain than are nuclear weapons, 
curtailment of conventional weapons and troops could result 1n a somewhat 
lower defense expenditure. Through economic diversion, monies previously
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expended on conventional forces could bo channeled Into growth producing 
areas of the Soviet economy.
Cutting the number of troops In uniform at one time In the Soviet 
military would free more young, healthy men for Industrial and agricultural 
labor. Changes 1n Soviet demographics Indicate that a labor shortage Is 
likely to confront the USSR particularly 1n the more Industrialised,
European part of the Soviet Union. A reduction 1n the number of youths 
drafted at one time could help to alleviate this problem.
Sufficient curtailment of conventional weapons and troops would even­
tually limit the number of troops which could be deployed outside a na­
tion's own boundaries. This would have a positive effect on the level of 
international tension, particularly If the Soviet Union was to remove Its 
troops deployed 1n .ie more stable WTO states. In this case, both Soviet- 
East European and East-West relations would be likely to Improve.
Although compulsory military service would probably continue, as It Is 
a useful method of socialization and sovletlzatlon, there would be fewer 
men serving at any one time. It Is generally acknowledged that while ser­
vice 1n the defense of the motherland is a patriotic duty which ought not to be 
shirked, life 1n the Soviet armed forces 1$ extremely difficult.. Any re­
duction In the length of active duty would be likely to Increase the popu­
larity of the Soviet leadership, provided that the general population per­
ceived that defense capabilities were not being compromised.
The size of a state's armed forces has long been taken as the measure 
of Its power. Its Influence, even Its right to exist. Conventional arms 
control, particularly If It results In a genuine parity of forces, affirms 
the Narxlst-Lenlnlst concept of peaceful coexistence. States with differing
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social system, yat comparable military forces, could,come to view one 
another as having comparable power, comparable Influence, and a comparable 
right to exist.
There arespeclal psychological gains to be made from conventional a r m  
control. For as much discussion as there Is on the subject of nuclear mls- 
sllas, the most common Image of the armed forces Is still that of a foot 
soldlar and a tank. Reductions 1n these areas are that much more real, and 
give more cause for optimism, than does the elimination of MIRVs or a re- 
ductlon 1n FBSs.
11. Curtailment of Military Budgets.
Throughout this analysis, It has been assumed that all negotiated 
agreements are genuine and verifiable. For that reason, 1t Is necessary to 
assume that the Soviet military budget would become public as a result of any 
agreement to curtail military expenditures.
This aspect of arms control 1s one where the Soviets benefit from the 
Implementation of this suggestion by other powers, particularly the United 
States. Limiting US defense spending would limit the American arms buildup 
and Its military modernization program. Assuming that this were enacted at 
a time of strategic parity between the superpowers, the Soviets could rest 
assured that control and curtailment of military budgets could maintain that 
parity as long as the US and the USSR had equally efficient defense expendi­
tures.
There would be a significant drop 1n military spending 1f this.; suggestion 
was amployad along with other nuclear and conventional arms control measures. 
Thi Soviet economy would benefit by a formal realignment of resources and 
capital from the military to the civilian, light Industrial sector of the 
economy. Long overdue capital expenditures In growth producing areas of the
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economy could be effected end the result could be • rise 1n the standard of 
living.
All economies could benefit from economic diversion from defense to 
civilian enterprises. This would contribute to e lessening of International 
tension and greater cooperation, especially In the areas of trade and economic 
policy. The Soviet Image as peacemaker and proletarian friend would be an- 
hanced If 1t were to Increase Its economic aid to Third World nations as a 
result of curtailing Its military budget.
At home, political legitimacy would rise along with the standard of 
living. A program of economic diversion would result In a population more 
supportive of the party and with genuine esteem for Its leadership. Political 
normalization would follow 1n due course.
In order for an Ideological concept to have weight, 1t must have credi­
bility. Without that, 1t cannot serve as a justification for past activities, 
let alone as a scientific-historic truth. Peaceful coexistence acts as the 
cornerstone of current Marx1st-Len1n1st thought on relations between dif­
fering social systems. If military budgets are slashed and coexistence that 
much less expensive to peacefully maintain, the credibility of Marxlst- 
Lenlnlst thought 1s enhanced through the dividends gained by successful Im­
plementation of the Ideals of peaceful coexistence.
During difficult economic times, fear of war and nuclear paralysis are 
joined by another fear, common to all economic systems: the specter of de­
cline, or 1n the case of the Soviet Union, the fear that the good times 
which have been promised for so long will never be attained, that the lines 
and tha shortages will never end. A program of economic diversion which sums 
from active curtailment of defense spending can help specters and fears to 
vanish. There are few things as hopeful as turning swords Into plowshares.
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12. Renunciation of the Use of New Discover 1m  or Achievements In the 
Sc1ent1f1c/Techn1cal Field for Mlltary Goals.
Thera are definite military and strategic gains the Soviets can 
stake by renouncing the use of new scientific discoveries for military Im­
provement. First of all, 1f this policy was one to which the United States 
and other iMdlng scientific and technological powers were to adhere* the 
Western technical Improvement of 1tsm111tar1es would slow down* giving the 
Soviets a chance to catch up by using 'less new* discoveries and achieve­
ments to further Its military goals.
In renouncing the use of technology for military gain* the West would 
no longer be able to use the excuse of national security to prevent tech­
nological transfer from West to East. There 1s certainly a market for 
Western technology 1»> the Soviet Union and there are presumably many 1n the 
West who would take advantage of this market and expand technological trade 
with the USSR for a handsome profit.
Access to this technology would have soma military applicability even 
1f 1t was meant as a peaceful exchange. Anything which Improves the Soviet 
Infrastructure or Increases economic efficiency will Improve Soviet defense 
capabilities. If only by Increasing the overall strength of the USSR as a 
nation.
Increased direct technical and other trade with the West would bene­
fit the Soviets economically 1f It was used to Improve economic and produc­
tive efficiency. Better use of raw materials, capital, labor, and technology 
would supplement and multiply the gains made by economic diversion.
Technological transfer might occur on a worldwide bails as well and 
as the technological levels of states equalise, there 1s less tension, more 
trust. The Soviet Union would become a direct consumer of Western tech­
nology. no longer relying on the German Democratic Republic as Its gateway
' ' « 
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to Western technical skills. The USSR might also be 1n a position to ox- 
port technology, thereby taking Its place as a scientific leader and gaining 
respect, credibility and legitimacy.
The scientific coamunlty within the Soviet Union, at times a source of 
dissent and uneasiness. Is more likely to be supportive of a regime that 
advances scientific and technical exchange as a means of arms control. And 
of course, the general population will be supportive of a leadership who 
provides them with a better quality of life, as well as a high standard of 
living.
It Is difficult to say just what Khrushchev expected from the concept 
of peaceful coexistence. Mhen he Introduced It, 1t was thought by Western 
analysts to be a sign to the world that the Soviet Union was emerging from 
Its Stalinist shell, forced by weapons of mass destruction to develop an 
ideological reappraisal of International relations. If that reappraisal 
results In a higher technological level for the USSR, made possible by In­
creased technical transfer steaming from the renunciation of the use of 
new scientific achievements for military goals, 1t will be used by the 
Soviets to show the world the success of Marxlst-Lenlnlst thought In red- 
duclng International tension to a point where such an exchange and Its 
benefits- are possible. If this 1s peaceful coexistence 1n action, It 1s 
an attractive Ideological concept.
A cooperative International atmosphere Is conducive to a reduction In 
psychic tension and military paranoia which today grips the developed so­
cieties, and 1n particular, the Soviet Union. Using the mind for peaceful 
discoveries which help foster life, rather than destroy 1t, Is a moral 
achievement of which the Soviets are quite capable and all people would bene-
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fit from the use of science to constructively aid humankind.
13. Correlation Between Disarmament and International Security.
A translation of this suggestion would appear to be: even at 
lower levels of armaments, the International power structure and spheres 
of Influence remain the same. This would bring military and strategic 
benefits to the Soviets. First of all, this correlation would tend to 
emphasize non-military problem solving, an area 1n which the Soviets appear 
to have some success. By non-military problem solving, It 1s meant that 
means other than military are used to resolve International conflicts and 
to bring fledgling nations under Soviet tutelage. At times this means dis­
patching brigades of nurses and educational specialists rather than soldiers 
but this Is easily accomplished by the Soviets and can result 1n later 
strategic advantages.
Acceptance of this correlation 1s tacit acceptance of spheres of In­
fluence, as long as force Is not used. International security means that 
borders do not change and nations which are under socialist control, remain 
so. Should a state wish to change Its government from a capitalist to a 
socialist regime, however, this 1s perfectly acceptable as there Is no turning 
back the hands of time or the wheels of historic progression.
Assuming International security Increases as more and more arms control 
measures are Implemented, the costs of defense can fall. Economic diversion 
of research and development resources, capital, and production resources 
could shift defense expenditures to the civilian sector of the economy. Ef­
ficient use of this economic diversion would result 1n an Increasing rate of 
economic growth and eventually, a higher standard of living.
As International security increases, the domestic perception of security
will also Increase. No longer will all human, economic, and natural re­
sources automatically be employed In the defense structure. This perception 
of security, combined with greater confidence 1n Soviet leadership, will al­
low the Soviets to concentrate their attention and resources on pressing 
domestic problems, such as a declining economic growth rate and demographic 
forecasts of labor shortages and cultural evolution.
The correlation of disarmament and International security 1s a goal of 
peaceful coexistence. Only through peaceful coexistence 1s such a correla­
tion possible. One should not assume however that this correlation shuts 
the door on further Ideological struggle. On the contrary, as with the 
Soviet concept of detente, the correlation of disarmament and International 
security ushers 1n a new era of heightened Ideological activity and Intensi­
fies the Ideological strugge 1n which capitalism and Communism are eternally 
engaged. Whether or not this struggle differs from the battles of old 
fashioned power politics 1s not the question. The fact 1s that from the 
viewpoint of Soviet Ideology, the quest for greater spheres of Soviet en­
lightenment, or Soviet domination, never ends.
De facto recognition of spheres of Influence, along with a greater per­
ception of Its own security, will allow the Soviets to view themselves as a 
legitimate and accepted world power. It 1s Impossible to adequately assess 
how vital a nation's self-concept 1s to Its International and domestic po­
litical relations. This self-concept, a key to the Soviet psyche, can only 
benefit from the Implementation of Its concept of a correlation of disarma­
ment and International security.
14. Worldwide Negotiations on Renunciation of Force In International 
Relations.
Successful negotiations on the renunciation of force 1n
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International relations would appear to be an end to the need for military
and strategic benefits but Indeed, sene would result from Implementation
fi
of this utopian concept. First of all, there would be less military ad- 
venturism and fewer Interventions by the West to which the Soviets might 
be compelled to respond. Avoiding the deployment of military forces Is as 
much a benefit as 1s successful employment of the military.
Secondly, this would put the Soviets 1n the position of asking that 
all military alliances be genuinely abandoned as an Indication of serious 
Interest in the successful renunciation of force 1n International relations. 
This would wreack strategic havoc with the American defense system which 
relies heavily on a network of military alliances but might cause the 
Americans to choose between that or being put 1n the uncomfortable position 
of appearing to endorse the use of force In International relations.
If 1n fact alliance systems are abandoned, the Soviets might benefit
by cutting back on {heir defense appropriations, In monies and In equipment, 
to Is WTO allies. Were the Soviets able to retain the advantages of WTO
arrangements at a lower cost, their own defense expenditures could decrease. 
And 1f the Soviets genuinely renounce the use of force In International 
relations, monies which might have been spent on Soviet-Inspired skirmishes 
or responses to American or other Intervention could be made available for 
economic diversion.
There 1s no doubt that renunciation of force 1n International relations 
would decrease International tension. There would certainly be popular sup­
port for such an Idea and 1f the Soviet Union had a leadership role 1n Its 
Implementation, International support for the Soviet Union would be streng­
thened. Renunciation of force would require a greater role for the United
*
46
Nations, or similar body, 1n world affairs and the Sovlat rola 1n any such 
organization would fee more legitimate and respected than 1s the case today.
In particular, the Soviets would place greater emphasis on a constructive 
attitude In $1no-$ov1et relations to avoid a S1no-Amer1can alliance. Even If 
such an alliance were economic and political rather than military, the Soviet 
Union would be perpetually dominated by the two, a situation 1n which the 
Soviets would surely find renunciation of force a bitter pill to swallow.
Internally, the realization that force and military strength are not 
the only solutions to International conflict would help bring about economic 
arrangements which foster efficiency and growth. Political normalization 
could be seen as Important for the long term security of the Soviet Union 
and becjme a goal of the party.
Renunciation of force 1n International relations 1s really the heart 
of peaceful coexistence and the embodiment of that concept 1n world affairs. 
The role of Ideology 1n conflict management would be greater and the Ideo­
logical split more bitter and Intense but this 1s the theoretical purpose 
of peaceful coexistence: to allow differing social systems to survive on 
their merits rather than their armaments.
Despite Intensification of the Ideological struggle, the International 
mood would be a cooperative one. This, along with a greater domestic per­
ception of security, would reduce the psychic tension of living 1n a modem 
world stuffed to the gills w1tn destructive military power.
15. Disarmament and Economic Development.
Q
A formal link between disarmament and economic development benefits 
the Soviets by allowing them to station economic and development specialists 
1n the Third World and other strategic areas. International sanction of this
'I
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activity would encourage the Soviets to Install greater numbers of these 
advisors than they might normally and thereby Increase their Influence and 
legitimate Interest 1n a host of strategic locations.
Economic development of the Third World would serve the Soviets well 
1n a future conflict with the West. Besides the fact that Third World 
states might be Indebted to the Soviets and therefore support them, 1n the 
event of an East-l^st conflict, any Improvement of the Infrastructure of 
the Third World would Increase the strategic Importance of the region. If 
Soviet Influence 1n a region 1s already established and a Soviet presence 
already Installed, military control of the area would more easily fall to 
the Soviets.
Linkage of dlsarament with economic development 1s the world wide 
Institutionalization of economic diversion, 1n this case, from the haves to 
the have nots. This policy could also be used to emphasize the economic 
development fo the Soviet Union through a formal process of diverting research 
and development resources, capital and production resources from the military 
to the civilian, light Industrial sector of the economy. Growth resulting 
from this could result 1n a higher standard of living for the average 
Soviet worker.
Worldwide economic development wouid also benefit the Soviet economy. 
Development would create and enlarge markets for Soviet goods and Increase 
demands for raw materials from the USSR. This would stimulate the civilian 
light Industrial sector of the economy and Increase the chances of a higher 
overall economic growth rate.
If economic development 1n Eastern Europe was aided by this Soviet link­
age, popular support for the Soviet Union might Increase. International 
relations would be less tense. Greater esteem for the Soviets In the Third
World would result 1n Increased legitimacy for the Soviets as a world 
leader. Perhaps at last* the Soviet Union would be vlowed as a positive 
force In International relations.
Economic diversion from the haves to the have note Is 1n keeping with 
Marxlst-Lenlnlst thought In terms of First-Third World economic relations. 
The Soviets are not able to unilaterally pursue such an ambitious program 
but 1n concert with the developed West, pursuit of Communist Ideals of 
world economic arrangements Is more likely to meet with some success. And 
1f the West were to support the Idea of direct and active linkage between 
disarmament and economic development* It could be taken as a tacit admis­
sion of the fallings of capitalism to secure a humane distribution of the 
world's wealth. All this 1s not to say that Soviet Ideals of economic 
justice are more humane In and of themselves but merely that Communist 
Ideology successfully conveys the picture of them as more humane. And 
of course* formal linkage of disarmament and economic development 1s 1n keep 
Ing with peaceful coexistence.
Redistribution of the world's wealth, or even the attempt at It* 1s a 
moral good when accomplished In a just and equitable manner. If the Soviet 
Union were to take a leadership role 1n this effort. It would at last find 
Itself as a world leader with a positive role In the eyes of both East and 
West. This psychological recharacterization would Increase the credibility 
and legitimacy of the Soviet Union and Its version of Marxism-Leninism* re­
sulting perhaps 1n foreign policy Initiatives based on mutual respect rather 
tswi ^ u a l  paranoia which, 1n the long run* should prove more successful.
III. National Interest >nd Ann* Control
For all states* national interests* like expected benefits* can be dis­
cussed 1n terms of military and strategic* economic* Ideological* and moral 
and psychological factors, as well as factors relating to foreign relations 
and domestic mood and politics. Every nation has an Interest In secure 
borders* a thriving economy, an Ideology, religion* or way of life which 
promotes unity* moral goods* International respect and Influence* and a sup­
portive citizenry. The Soviet Union 1s no different from other states 1n this 
regard. Recognition of this fact 1s the first step 1n analyzing the rela­
tionship between arms control and Soviet national Interest.
Like other nations* the priorities attached to various national Interests 
change 1n the Soviet Union over time. National Interests are Interdependent. 
It 1s foolish to assume that since the USSR Is an authoritarian state, Its 
Interests are determined solely by the whims of those 1n power at the moment, 
whose chief Interest 1s, of course* maintaining their power position for as 
long as possible. No one factor can be the single determinant of Soviet 
national Interest* but analysis of expected benefits by factor can show the 
general direction of Soviet national Interest as 1t relates to arms control 
policies.
By analyzing the expected military and strategic benefits from Implement­
ing the arms control measures outlined 1n the June 18* 1982 memorandum to 
the delegates of the United Nations Second Special Session on Disarmament* 
the possibllltes for advancing a variety of military and strategic Interests 
become apparent. The Soviet penchant for security Is well known. Like all 
nations* It would like to maintain secure borders and, like many nations*
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It would like to expend Its influence geographically end within other social 
systems. In order to further these Interests, i m control can be used to 
emphasize conventional weapons and warfare, to avoid a two-front alliance 
against the Soviet Union and, at least during the period of negotiations, 
possibly divide the Western alliance. The Soviet Union also has a strategic 
Interest 1n avoiding a nuclear exchange as, like the United States, the 
Soviets cannot be sure that they could weather a nuclear attack, and of 
course, this Interest can best be served by serious arms control efforts.
The USSR, like all nations, has a legitimate Interest 1n developing 
and maintaining a thriving economy. During the Stalinist revolution, heavy 
Industry and military development were seen as the key to economic growth.
It 1s rapidly becoming apparent, however, that 1n order to maintain overall 
economic growth, It will be necessary to diversify and expand the economic 
base of the Soviet Union.
Arms control efforts can support this diversification by making economic 
diversion. Increased trade, and Increased technical exchange possible. Suc­
cessful economic redirection can result In an Increased standard of living 
for the average Soviet worker, a situation which should contribute to greater 
productivity and a corresponding Increase In the economic growth rate.
The Soviet Union has a very special Interest 1n International relations. 
Although 1t 1s a military superpower, the USSR seems to lack the International 
respect and legitimacy which 1s accorded to most states. In order to advance 
Soviet Influence geographically and within other social systems, the Soviets 
need to make their Influence felt 1n many areas, not just as a military power. 
Serious arms control efforts and successful negotiated agreements In which 
the Soviets have a leadership role will Increase the International respect
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and legitimacy the Soviets crave, allowing them to be Instrumental 1n cre­
ating a period of International calm.
This period of International calm will allow the Soviets room to 
maneuver In domestic problem solving. Although the Soviet Union often play* 
up International discord and security threats to the USSR 1n order to unite 
Its citizenry and make excuses for delayed gratification of revolutionary 
success, a reduction 1n International tension would allow Soviet leaders 
to concentrate more fully on pressing domestic problems such as a stagnating 
economy, future cultural and demographic changes, and the need to diversify 
the military, economic, and political power base of the USSR.
Domestic problems are normally the result of a conflict between ef*" 
flclency and control. In order for enterprises, bureaucracies, even ethnic 
groups and families, to function efficiently and effectively In fulfilling 
their economic and societal roles, a certain amount of autonomy Is necessary. 
This, however, conflicts with the economic, political, and social structure 
the Communist party has developed In order to maintain Its power to control 
the population. The roots of this conflict run deep. In the period Im­
mediately following the October Revolution, the most efficient way to organ­
ize the population so as to preserve the gains of the revolution and to de­
velop a productive economic and social structure was to allow the party to 
create political control mechanisms which afforded them total control over 
all aspects of the newly created Soviet society.
These coni , mechanisms were Institutionalized during the Stalin 
Revolution and remain In one form or another today. During the Brezhnev 
period, efforts were made to transform government and party transmission 
belts Into consensus building bodies but, as 1s always the case when efficiency 
and control conflict, control remains the dominant factor 1n Soviet political
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management. As long as this 1s nacassary to maintain tha Sovlat form of 
government, prograss toward economic and buraaucratlc afflclancy will re- 
ma1n slow.
In ordar for raal aconomlc and societal prograss to taka place, this 
conflict batwaan afflclancy and control must ba resolved. By analyzing 
tha axpactad banaflts from succassful arms control efforts, 1t 1s apparent 
that tha regulation of tha production, deployment, and use of arms may ba 
useful 1n creating tha conditions which would result In a solution to this 
Important problem. Besides creating a period of International tension, sue* 
cessful arms control efforts could lead to Increased technical exchange.
This, plus Increased political legitimacy and political normalization. Is 
the key to tha solution of tha efficiency versus control problem.
Increased technical exchange will provide the tools with which tha 
economy and the bureaucracy can be made more efficient. Exchange of manage­
ment techniques, communications systems, accounting methods, etc. as well 
as high technology will Improve the overall efficiency of the Soviet economy. 
The Import of Ideas and technology from the Mast has long been a solution 
to Russian and Soviet problems but, 1n order for the transfer to be completely 
successful, there must also be a relinquishment of at least some of the 
party's total control.1** There must be political changes which will allow 
the Soviet Union to function with Its Conmunlst government, but without the 
terror and repression which normally accompany authoritarian regimes.
There Is at least soma evidence that these political changes can and 
wtll occur. Mhlla 1t 1s too soon to evaluate, the direction of Mr. Andropov1! 
government, there 1s a discernible difference between the political atmos­
phere of the 1980s and that of the Stalin period. Arms control efforts with 
benefits which Include Increased political legitimacy will lead to political
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normalization, a point where control mtchanlsms naad not ba total In ordar 
to develop and maintain a genuinely supportlva cltlzanry. Th1« would allow 
graatar economic and social autonomy which, along with Increased efficiency, 
would result 1n an and to stagnation and the beginning of a new growth peri­
od for the USSR, one In which progress would be more than just military, 
but also economic, social, cultural and ideological.
This economic, social, cultural, and Ideological progress would allow 
the Soviets to become more competitive In all areas of International ex­
change. The military dimension would continue to be Important, however 
solving the efficiency vs. control dilemma through the Import of Western 
technology and political normalization would allow other Important facets 
of Soviet society to be developed and strengthened.
Ideology 1s one of those Important facets of Soviet society. Whether 
or not Marxism-Leninism Is meant as a scientific-historic truth or merely 
as a justification for social imperialism, the USSR has an Interest 1n main­
taining Its Ideological legitimacy. Successful arms control efforts can 
further that Interest by lending credibility to Narx1st-Len1n1st thought.
As the Ideals of Commmlsm are manifested through peaceful coexistence and 
arms control, the Image of the Soviets as peacemakers and Communism as a 
peace creating Ideology gains credibility. This In turn lends credibility 
to the USSR as a whole. As the Soviet Union and Its Ideology gain credi­
bility, the legitimacy of alternate social systems Increases.
It would become harder and harder for the West to peg every conflict, 
every failure, and every disturbance on the existence of Communism as long 
as the Soviets are active 1n arms control efforts. As time goes on, the 
West will develop Its own Ideas of peaceful coexistence; the Question would
M
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no longer be, how can we free those Imprisoned behind the Iron Curtain 
and roll back the Rad Menace, but rather, how can we benefit the most from 
the pretence of Communism and alternate social systems 1n the world power 
structure. Tills acceptance of the USSR as a legitimate power broker would 
further the Soviet Interest 1n expanding Its Influence geographically and 
In other social systems.
To many, the most Important Interest advanced through arms control Is 
a moral one: the avoidance of nuclear devastation. It Is not clear where 
this fits In Soviet arms control efforts 1n terms of priorities, but 1t 1s 
certain that the moral considerations Involved 1n a nuclear arms race are 
at least an Issue for Soviet policymakers. It would seem Impossible for 
a nation which had seen as much death and destruction as did the Soviet 
Union 1n World War II to disregard the very human Implications of an un­
restrained arms race and for that reason alone, the USSR has a moral In­
terest 1n arms control.
IV. Conclusions
The relationship between arms control and Soviet national Interest 1$ 
not a clear-cut or predictable one. The Interests the USSR would like to 
advance through arms control are varied, far reaching and Interdependent.
The arms control measures suggested 1n the June 18, 1982 memorandum are 
aiming at the long range goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons. The 
national Interests the Soviet Union Intends to further through arms control 
arc equally far reaching and seemingly unattainable.
During the first phase of Soviet history, the creation and development 
of the Soviet state, building a military-heavy Industrial complex was 1n 
the national Interest. It allowed society to be organized and placed under 
the control of the Communist Party. It enhanced Soviet security and gave 
the USSR the power to enforce Its will In neighboring states. It stimulated 
economic growth and development and created a standard of living higher than 
that of the pre-revolutionary period. All of this transformed the Soviet 
Union Into a superpower with the United States as Its only military rival.
Analysis of the memorandum to the delegates of the United Nations 
Second Special Session on Disarmament would seem to Indicate that the Soviet 
Union 1s moving Into a second phase of nat1on-bu11d1ng and that arms control 
1$ the key to realizing this national Interest. This second phase might be 
considered one of Institutionalized normalcy. It would require new power 
relationships with allies and adversaries, relationships based on economic 
and political Influence rather than strict military power. It would also 
entail new economic stablltty and a diversified economic base which would 
emphasize growth 1n the civilian, light Industrial sector of the economy.
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Institutionalized normalcy would require the Soviets to solve the 
problem of Ideological decline. Communist Ideology must gain credibility 
In the eyes of the world and the Soviet citizenry or be phased out after 
becoming totally meaningless and useless even for rationalization and 
justification. A positive *'ola and a new International and domestic Image 
are needed for the continued growth of Soviet Influence at home and abroad. 
All of these are Interests which the Soviet Union hopes to further through 
arms control.
One must be careful, however, not to equate Institutionalised nor­
malcy with liberalism or democratization, or think that this second phase 
of building the Soviet nation will necessarily result 1n friendly or trusting 
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. On the contrary,
’ as Soviet power diversifies and Increases through economic growth and the 
development of genuinely supportive citizenry, competition between the 
superpowers will Increase on every level. At the present time, the USSR 
competes effectively with the United States and other powers on a purely 
military level. In no other endeavor does the Soviet Union enjoy superiori­
ty or even parity. Institutionalized normalcy would lead to a Soviet Union 
which 1s able to effectively compete In all spheres of International political 
Ufa, foreign trade, quality Industrial production, International Influence, 
etc.
The Soviet Union 1s basically a conservative, Imperialist power and 
this will not change. Although arms control will limit the production, 
deployment and use of arms, the military dimension will always ba a part 
of International relations. Imperialist gains will continue to be made by
both the East and Most. The fact that these Interests are advanced through
4
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the control of the production, deployment, end use of amis, however, may 
ensure that potential competition will not result In the destruction of 
the earth and life as It Is known today.
The achievement of this second phase of nation-bullding, institutionalized 
normalcy, like the total elimination of nuclear weapons, may never be at­
tained. It 1s not certain what form this stage 1n Soviet development will 
take. It 1s possible that 1t may be reached without arms control but what 
1s certain 1s that It 1s an Interest which 1s actively advanced through the 
process of arms control.
The concept of Institutionalized normalcy is a broad one. Its shape 
will be defined by numerous International developments as well as the 
specifics of negotiated agreements relating to arms control. It Is a fluid 
rether than well-defined goal and yet, arms control 1s most definitely a 
means toward Its accomplishment.
Understanding that this, rather than merely the control of a particular 
weapons system. Is the real goal of arms control negotiations 1s vital to 
the creation of an International system of arms control and security. When
proposals to control the production, deployment, and use of arms are analyzed 
1n terms of expected benefits and national Interest, It becomes possible to 
discover the real goal of any suggestad arms control measure. This knowledge 
can then be used to negotiate more easily a successful arms control agreement 
which 1s 1n the Interest of all parties.
In the case of the far-reech1ng arms control measures suggested 1n the 
June 18, 1982 memorandum to the delegates of the United Nations Second Special 
Session on Dlsarm ement, the real Interest to be advanced 1s that of Insti­
tutionalized normalcy for the USSR. This long range goal Is the key to the
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direction of Soviet s m s  control policy. Acknowledging this Is the key to 
s m s  control success 1n the 21st century.
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7.1 5.2 3.8 3.4^3t7
5.3 3.8 2.8 na®
7.6 7.0 3.5 1.9-2.8
7.5 7.9 7.0 5.4-
1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9?
2.0 1.8 1.1 0.5*
1.3 •0.1 *0.3 na
8.5 7.4 4.5 4.7-5.1
8.6 7.8 4.7 4.7-5.1
8.4 6.5 3.8 4.9-5.2
6.4 6.0 3.6 na
3.9 2.5 1.7 2.3-2.7
3.6 2.2 1.4 na
5.0 2.9 1.6 na
"♦planned
*The two Soviet official series given here relate to national Income 
but exclude diverse servicest they differ somewhat 1n scope and manner Of 
compilation, which need not concern us here.
bFor 1975-79.
cNot available or not applicable.
^Sorne at the CIA feel that the 11th FYP Indicates anticipated annual 
growth of 4.0 percent.
*These figures are Independent projections, not plan goals.
^Calculated as the yearly rate of growth of the average for the given 
five-year period over the average for the preceedlng five-year period.
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From Abram Barston, "Soviet Economic Slowdown and the 1M1-88 Plan,"
Problems s i C p p inlam v. XXX (May-Juhe 1981): 26. The target aat for 
annuaigrowtiMnneliona 1 Income for the 1961-85 plan 1s 30-3,71. This 
la modest 1n comparison with tho planned annual growth roto for tho 1976-80 
period, 4.76, which waa not fulfilled. If the projected Inereaae In the 
growth of national Income 1a not reached, assuming that defense procurement 
remains the stole, that la, 12-146 of the 8HP with an annual growth rate 
of 4-56, spending tradeoffs will be necessary In either consumer Industrial 
spending (firoup I), or In Investmdnt spending, which has dropped sharply 
since the 1965-70 plan. As the growth In national Income declines, expan­
sion of goods and services for consumption and the military 1s possible only 
at the expense of capital expenditure. Economic diversion could reverse this 
trend of declining growth 1n Soviet national Income and arrest the process 
of economic erosion due to reduced capital expenditures.
8See A.A. Sldorenkr, The Offensive.. Soviet Military Thought Series, 
no. 1 (Washington, D.C.: US government Printing Office, 1974). for an 
In-depth classic discussion of Soviet scenarios and nuclear strategy.
^Details of this Soviet arms control proposal are not from the 18 
June 82 memorandum hut from composite Soviet statements on the current arms 
control negotiation: 1n Europe such as Yu. Andropov,. "Sixty Years of the 
USSR," C g p  v. XXXIV, n. 51, p. 7.
7The obvious disparity In nuclear capabilities between France and 
Great Britain, and the USSR Is reflected In these figures from The Military 
lajingi 1982-63 (London: The Intemetlonal Institute for StratigTc Studioi,imrr
Intermediate Range Land-Based Missiles:
Frence-18 
United K1ngdom-0 
USSR-606
Medium Range Bombers 
France-0
United K1ngdon-48 
USSR-925
®Th1s concept Is particularly utopian In light of continual Soviet 
promises to fulfill "their urgent duty to do everything In their power to 
facilitate the establishment of political equality amongracesindrespect 
for the rights of people to self-determination and to complete political and 
economic Independence for all states" (emphasis added] as 1n Yu Andropov 
"Sixty Years of the USSR," £gSP, v. XXXIV, n. 51, p. 5.
’It should be noted that there Is an Inherent contradiction between 
the concept of disarmament and economic development linkage and the current 
Soviet policy of supporting national liberation movements as the best way 
to facilitate the establishment of political equality and self-determlnatlen. 
Non-military economic development Is quite a different method of attaining 
Socialist gains than 1s anas transfers 1n support of nationalist or revolu­
tionary groups and It is not at all clear how, or why, the Soviets would 
carry out such a change of heart.
61
< | Q
not bo f l l S f l ! 1®  I?!sc * ? T  Pfrt^ ’s total control would
JkM S J . S L T ' V * !  W 1 WtUrt *11to and owa Must not 
or^qulckly* ^  C an®* n th# * ” < «  P°w#r atructuro would corn aaslly
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